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Comments
The Robot-Transporter: Sex Trafficking,




Despite global condemnation, sex trafficking continues to
plague our world.  Even in developed countries, the problem per-
sists.  Technological advancements, like the Internet, have
spurred the development of organized sex trafficking networks
and have made “transactions” easier.  Although law enforcement
agencies have tried to adapt their investigative techniques to
combat the problem, developments in technology move at a
much quicker rate.
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) will present a new set of chal-
lenges for law enforcement agencies in the fight against sex traf-
ficking.  In the not-too-distant future, AVs, or “self-driving cars,”
will dominate the roadways.  An AV will be completely aware of
the surrounding world and will be programmed to respond ap-
propriately to cues that it receives from these surroundings.
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An AV should also be aware of the happenings inside its
passenger compartment.  Because an AV will perpetually focus
on the roads, its human occupants can turn their attention else-
where.  A pimp, for instance, will be able to continuously moni-
tor his reluctant, minor passenger.  And, because the AV will
obey all traffic laws, police are less likely to find cause to pull
over an AV.  Thus, AVs will make evading police detection easier
for a sex trafficker.
This Comment argues that curtailing sex trafficking in an
AV-dominated future requires imposing federal criminal liability
on AV manufacturers for failing to equip their AVs with facial-
recognition technology.  First, this Comment examines current
federal laws criminalizing sex trafficking and explains how these
laws are insufficient to hold AV manufacturers criminally liable.
Next, this Comment demonstrates how civil penalties and regula-
tory fines are insufficient deterrent mechanisms.  Finally, this
Comment proposes a statute that requires standards for the fa-
cial-recognition technology, imposes criminal liability for viola-
tions of such standards, and creates a federal commission
authorized to set such standards.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The year is 2040.  Holly, a 14-year-old missing child, is in a car
with Jim, the 38-year-old leader of a sex trafficking ring.  The car
has no steering wheel or pedals, obeys all traffic laws, and travels
towards a destination predetermined by Jim via a cellphone appli-
cation; it is an autonomous vehicle (AV).  Because Holly has been
with Jim for several weeks, she knows that they are heading to-
wards a motel where Jim will force her to have sex with other older
men for money.
Holly asks Jim why he always makes her “do disgusting things
with men” and pleads with him to take her back to her parents.
Sick of Holly’s whining, Jim slaps her across the face and tells her to
be quiet before he hurts her worse than that.  Holly begins to cry
and clutches her cheek but says nothing more.  Eventually, the pair
arrive at the motel and Jim forces Holly to go to work.
In an AV-dominated future, police will have no cause to pull
over vehicles that obey all traffic laws.  In fact, if all goes as it
should, an AV’s passengers will almost never interact with police
officers because the always-alert AV will avoid all car accidents.  So
how is Holly supposed to escape from Jim?  Holly has no control
over the vehicle’s destinations because Jim forbids her from using a
cellphone.  And because the vehicle controls itself, Jim can continu-
ously monitor Holly to ensure that she does not try to jump out.
As defined by the U.S. Code, sex trafficking is “the recruit-
ment, harboring, transportation, provision, obtaining, patronizing,
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or soliciting of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act.”1
The Code also refers to human trafficking as a modern form of slav-
ery.2  Recently, Congress passed a law that penalizes website cre-
ators who remain complicit while others use their website for sex
trafficking.3  The passage of this law demonstrates Congress’s will-
ingness to impose criminal penalties on third parties whose technol-
ogy facilitates sex trafficking.4
In order to function correctly, an AV must be hyper-aware of
its surroundings.5  Today, technology that equips computers with
the ability to recognize a person’s face or mood exists (hereinafter
“facial-recognition technology”).6   Further, under current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, individuals travelling on public roads
have a diminished expectation of privacy in their vehicles7 and no
expectation of privacy in their movements on public roadways.8
Therefore, including facial-recognition technology in AVs is both
legally and technologically feasible for AV manufacturers.9
1. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(10) (2018).
2. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1) (2018) (“Trafficking in persons is a modern
form of slavery, and it is the largest manifestation of slavery today.”).
3. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub.
L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230 and in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
4. Id.; see infra Part II.C.2.
5. E.g., Technology, WAYMO [hereinafter Waymo Tech], http://bit.ly/2QscSgO
(last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (describing the different types of sensors an AV will use
to monitor its surroundings); see also infra Part II.A.
6. See, e.g., Arthur Allen, Feeling Mad? New Devices Can Sense Your Mood
and Tell—or Even Text—Others., WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2014), http://wapo.st/
2yhQxuy (discussing how sensors can interpret internal bodily signals associated
with emotions and tell others what a person is feeling); Curtis Silver, Patents Re-
veal How Facebook Wants to Capture Your Emotions, Facial Expressions and
Mood, FORBES (June 8, 2017), http://bit.ly/2zjvFn4 (discussing how Facebook re-
ceived patents to use emotion-detecting technology).
7. E.g., Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526 (2018).  For a thorough
application of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to AVs, see Lindsey Bar-
rett, Note, Herbie Fully Downloaded: Data-Driven Vehicles and the Automobile
Exception, 106 GEO. L.J. 181 (2017).
8. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213–16 (2018) (clarifying how
tracking a person’s movements via their cell phone goes beyond allowing police
officers to follow automobiles for a short period of time without violating the
Fourth Amendment); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012); United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one place to another.”).
9. The author of this Comment acknowledges that there are privacy concerns
with including facial recognition technology in AVs.  Addressing all of these con-
cerns, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. See infra notes 132–138 and
accompanying text (discussing the information already collected by car compa-
nies); see generally Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA
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Society recognizes the horrors of sex trafficking.10  The advent
of AVs facilitates an environment that allows sex trafficking to re-
main unnoticed more easily and intensifies the challenges for law
enforcement in combatting sex trafficking.11  In the past, Congress
has successfully criminalized a manufacturer’s failure to proactively
prevent the dangerous misuse of its products.  For example, the
number of recalls for toys made with lead paint dropped to zero
after Congress imposed harsher criminal penalties on manufactur-
ers.12  Thus, Congress should impose criminal liability on an AV
manufacturer that fails to implement facial-recognition technology
in its AVs and create a new federal commission to develop the pa-
rameters of this technology.
Part II of this Comment provides background on the advent of
AVs and the criminalization of sex trafficking; it also demonstrates
how current sex trafficking laws do not apply to AV manufacturers.
Part II also highlights previous instances where Congress compelled
companies to take proactive measures using the threat of criminal
penalties.  Part III demonstrates how criminal punishment effec-
tively deters manufacturer complicity while civil damages and regu-
latory fines do not.  Part III also sets forth the structure of this
Comment’s Proposed Legislation to compel AV manufacturers to
be proactive.  Part IV provides concluding remarks on the issues
addressed in this Comment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Introducing Autonomous Vehicles
Advancements in artificial intelligence and vehicle technology
have led to the creation of self-driving cars.13  While there are tiers
of automation, a vehicle that operates without any human interven-
tion is at “level five automation.”14  Vehicles at level five automa-
tion do not require a steering wheel or pedals.15  These self-driving
cars are known as “autonomous vehicles” (AVs) because the car
CLARA L. REV. 1171 (2012) (proposing suggestions for how best to handle poten-
tial privacy issues associated with AVs).
10. E.g., What Is Human Trafficking?, NAT’L HUM. TRAFFICKING HOTLINE,
http://humantraffickinghotline.org (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
11. See infra notes 163–73 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part II.D.1–2; see also infra notes 191–92 and accompanying text.
13. E.g., Waymo Tech, supra note 5.
14. Matt Burgess, When Does a Car Become Truly Autonomous? Levels of
Self-Driving Technology Explained, WIRED (Apr. 21, 2017), http://bit.ly/SAE
Wired.
15. Id.
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itself makes all the decisions that a human driver ordinarily would
make.16
Some vehicles available for purchase have self-driving capabili-
ties.17  But even these vehicles require that the human occupant re-
main ready to retake control of the vehicle, if necessary.18  Out of
all the vehicles currently available for purchase, none are at level
five automation.19  Nevertheless, AVs do exist.20  For instance, in
2015, Waymo21 successfully achieved the world’s first fully autono-
mous ride on a public road.22
The anticipated dominance of AVs will likely render human
drivers unnecessary.23  While nobody can definitively predict the
configuration of AV-dominated roadways, AV developers have in-
vested time and money into their preferred visions of the future.24
Some developers foresee a world where ridesharing dominates.25
Other developers foresee a world where people own personal
16. See Jeffrey K. Gurney, Crashing into the Unknown: An Examination of
Crash-Optimization Algorithms Through the Two Lanes of Ethics and the Law, 79
ALB. L. REV. 183, 189–90 (2016) (providing the history of self-driving cars).
17. E.g., Model S, TESLA, http://www.tesla.com/models (last visited Sept. 16,
2018) (highlighting Tesla’s Autopilot feature); Model X, TESLA, http://www.tesla.
com/modelx (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (same).
18. See Danny Yadron & Dan Tynan, Tesla Driver Dies in First Fatal Crash
While Using Autopilot Mode, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2016), http://bit.ly/TeslaDeath
(illustrating the consequences of a driver’s failure to remain alert behind the wheel
in autopilot mode even though the car instructs the driver to remain alert and
highlighting the lingering need for a human driver in current commercially availa-
ble self-driving cars).
19. See, e.g., Alex Davies, This Is Big: A Robo-Car Just Drove Across the
Country, WIRED (Apr. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Davies, This Is Big], http://bit.ly/
DelphiRoboCar (discussing how an autonomous vehicle drove from San Francisco
to New York but still required human intervention in a few situations).
20. E.g., Waymo Tech, supra note 5.
21. Waymo began as the Google self-driving car project in 2009 and became
an independent company in 2016. Journey, WAYMO, http://waymo.com/journey/
(last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
22. Id. (describing the first fully self-driving ride on public roads:  a blind man,
alone, in a vehicle without a steering wheel or pedals).
23. Vivek Wadhwa, Move Over, Humans, the Robo-Cars Are Coming, WASH.
POST (Oct. 14, 2014), http://wapo.st/2i6izFA (predicting that the debate in 15 years
will be whether humans should be allowed to drive at all).
24. E.g., Mike Isaac, Uber Bets on Artificial Intelligence with Acquisition and
New Lab, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2kMfzz2.
25. See Looking Further, FORD, http://ford.to/2g59g4v (last visited Sept. 16,
2018); Anthony Levandowski, San Francisco, Your Self-Driving Uber Is Arriving
Now, UBER BLOG (Dec. 14, 2016), http://ubr.to/2hDkPQw (discussing the bene-
fits of ride sharing and autonomous vehicles).
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AVs.26  In any case, it is likely that both personal and shareable AVs
will simultaneously dominate the roadways of the future.27
By taking human drivers off the road, AVs will quell the lead-
ing cause of traffic accidents:  human error.28  Automobile manufac-
turers’ announcements of their decisions to pursue AV production
cite the safety benefits of AVs; specifically, AVs are safer because
they have heightened awareness and intelligence.29  Consequently,
AVs will eliminate tired, drunk, and distracted driving.30
Further, AVs will respond to external signals by using different
sensors to determine road conditions, anticipate the movements of
other vehicles, and respond properly.31  AVs will even communicate
with pedestrians32 and respond appropriately to emergency sirens.33
While AV manufacturers are spending thousands of hours training
their AVs to navigate the roads safely,34 these same manufacturers
are overlooking the development of unique safety features for in-
side the AV.35  In creating a vehicle that protects passengers from
external threats only, an AV manufacturer disregards severe inter-
nal threats.36
26. Alex Davies, The Mercedes Robo-Car That Made Me Want to Stop Driv-
ing, WIRED (Mar. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Davies, Mercedes Robo-Car], http://bit.ly/
2ykIT4e; Paul Stenquist, Nissan Announces Plans to Release Driverless Cars by
2020, N.Y. TIMES: WHEELS (Aug. 29, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://nyti.ms/2ykAFJv; Jack
Stewart, Elon Musk Says Every New Tesla Can Drive Itself, WIRED (Oct. 19, 2016),
http://bit.ly/2yKDmWb.
27. Johanna Zmud & Paul Carlson, Realistically, Here’s What the Very Near
Future of Self-Driving Cars Looks Like, BUS. INSIDER (July 30, 2017, 9:33 AM),
http://bit.ly/selfdrivefuture.
28. Laiza King, Top 15 Causes of Car Accidents and How You Can Prevent
Them, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (Aug. 31, 2016, 11:24 AM), http://bit.ly/
2F7jmAN.
29. See, e.g., Conor Dougherty, Self-Driving Trucks May Be Closer than They
Appear, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2jmzsfU (explaining how self-
driving semi-trucks can reduce accidents if the trucks communicate with each other
while under way); see also Margaret Krauss, Bikes May Have to Talk to Self-Driv-
ing Cars for Safety’s Sake, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 24, 2017), http://n.pr/2F9e5Zo
(describing how bicycles and AVs will need to communicate).
30. See Gurney, supra note 16, at 189; Wadhwa, supra note 23.
31. E.g., Waymo Tech, supra note 5.
32. See Aarian Marshall, Want to Teach Self-Driving Vehicles to Talk? Pre-
tend You’re a Car Seat, WIRED (Sept. 13, 2017), http://bit.ly/2gCVUwT (describing
how Ford determined that a series of lights on the windshield was an effective way
for AVs to interact with pedestrians).
33. E.g., Jack Stewart, Driverless Cars Need Ears as Well as Eyes, WIRED
(Aug. 21, 2017), http://bit.ly/DrivCarEyeEar (describing how Waymo’s vehicles
learned the different sounds of emergency vehicles and the appropriate response
needed).
34. E.g., id.
35. E.g., Davies, This Is Big, supra note 19.
36. See infra Part II.C.2.
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B. Congress Takes a Stand Against Sex Trafficking
Sex trafficking currently plagues the United States.37  In 2000,
Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention
Act38 (TVPA), which made engaging in sex trafficking a federal
crime.39  In the “Purposes and Findings” of the TVPA, Congress
criticized how “the seriousness of [trafficking] is not reflected in
current sentencing guidelines, [and this results] in weak penalties
for convicted traffickers.”40  Motivated in part by the haphazard na-
ture of competing state laws,41 Congress uniformly criminalized this
horrid act.42  Congress also called on the nations of the world to
take similar action because sex trafficking is a formidable interna-
tional problem.43  The remainder of this section breaks down the
parameters of the current federal laws prohibiting sex trafficking.44
1. Prohibition of Sex Trafficking in the United States Code
In enacting the TVPA, Congress determined that because “the
right to be free from slavery and involuntary servitude is . . . [an]
unalienable right[ ] . . .  [c]urrent practices of sexual slavery and
trafficking of women and children are similarly abhorrent to the
principles upon which the United States was founded.”45  With the
creation of the TVPA, Congress criminalized the act of transporting
a minor into sexual slavery,46 an act that already constituted a fed-
37. See, e.g., Priscilla Alvarez, When Sex Trafficking Goes Unnoticed in
America, ATLANTIC (Feb. 23, 2016), http://bit.ly/UnnoticedSexTrafficking.
38. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18,
22 & 42 U.S.C.).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2018).
40. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(15) (2018).
41. Id. § 7101(b)(14) (“Existing legislation and law enforcement in the United
States . . . are inadequate to deter trafficking and bring traffickers to justice . . . .”).
42. Id. § 7101(b)(21) (“Trafficking in persons is an evil requiring concerted
and vigorous action by countries of origin, transit or destination . . . .”).
43. Id. § 7101(b)(24) (“Trafficking in persons is a transnational crime with na-
tional implications.”).  Although Congress implores the nations of the world to
take action in this subsection, this proclamation does not bind other countries to
enact similar legislation:  only a formal treaty can bind another country to do so.
See What Is a Treaty?, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://bit.ly/LOCdfTreaty (last visited
Sept. 16, 2018).
44. See infra Part II.B.1–4.
45. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(22).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2018) (listing “transports” as one of the acts that
§ 1591 prohibits); see also United States v. Valenzuela, 495 F. App’x 817, 822 (9th
Cir. 2012) (clarifying transportation was just one act which constituted sex traffick-
ing but not an essential element of the offense).
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eral crime.47  Under 18 U.S.C. § 2423,48 it is illegal to transport a
minor in interstate commerce with the intent that the minor engage
in prostitution.49  Consequently, for this one action—transporting a
minor—law enforcement may hold an actor criminally liable under
both the TVPA and the crime of transportation.50
Yet, the two offenses are significantly different.51  The crux of
the federal crime of transportation under § 2423 is the affirmative
intent of the actor.52  The actor must intend for the minor to engage
in prostitution.53  The crux of the TVPA, however, is the knowledge
of the actor.54  Here, the actor only must know or recklessly disre-
gard the fact that the minor “will be caused” to engage in an illegal
sex act.55
Despite the existence of 18 U.S.C. § 2423, Congress chose to
separately criminalize the act of transporting a minor even when
the actor merely knew that the minor would “be caused” to engage
in a commercial sex act.56  The difference between § 1591 and
§ 2423 is slight.57  However, “the essence of the narrow distinction
between [intent and knowledge] is the presence or absence of a
positive desire to cause the result.”58  Although both § 1591 and
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (2018) (prohibiting transporting minors in inter-
state commerce with the intent that the minor engage in an illegal sex act).
48. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 § 3(a), 18
U.S.C. § 2423 (2018).
49. Id. § 2423(a).
50. E.g., United States v. Williams, 428 F. App’x 134, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2011)
(finding sufficient evidence to support the lower court’s conviction of the defen-
dant under both 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581 and 2423 when he transported a 16-year-old girl
into four different states with the purpose of causing her to engage in commercial
sex acts).
51. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (requiring that the actor know or recklessly
disregard the result of child prostitution), with 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (requiring that
the actor intend prostitution as the result).
52. Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 375 (1944) (“What Congress
has outlawed by [§ 2423] . . . is the use of interstate commerce as a calculated
means for effectuating sexual immorality.”).
53. Williams, 428 F. App’x at 139 (noting that the actor’s intent is the focus of
§ 2423, not whether the prostitution is actually accomplished).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); see United States v. Estrada-Tepal, 57 F. Supp. 3d
164, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (confirming that § 1591 does not require intent); United
States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186, 1195 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); see also Estrada-Tepal, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 169; United
States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2013) (listing the three ele-
ments of § 1591:  (1) acted with knowledge, (2) in or affecting interstate commerce,
and (3) that the actor knew of or recklessly disregarded the future prostitution).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).
57. Compare id. (requiring knowledge or reckless disregard), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(a) (2018) (requiring specific intent).
58. PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES
124 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) (emphasis in original).
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§ 2423 prohibit the same conduct, only § 2423 requires that the ac-
tor possess the positive desire—intent—to cause the minor to en-
gage in sexual activity.59
Accordingly, § 2423 requires a more stringent finding of the
actor’s mental state, or mens rea, than § 1591 requires.60  When
transporting a minor across state lines, an AV will not intend for the
minor to engage in sexual activity.61  The AV will intend only to
transport its passengers safely from Point A to Point B.62  Thus, an
AV will not be criminally liable under § 2423.63  Similarly, an AV
manufacturer will not be criminally liable for the AV’s role in trans-
porting a minor under § 2423.64  Manufacturers intend only to turn
a profit from the widespread use of their AVs.65
In light of the implausibility of holding an AV manufacturer
criminally liable under § 2423, this Comment focuses on § 1591.
Section 1591 has a less stringent mens rea requirement than § 2423
and also criminalizes a broader range of conduct.66  By twice
criminalizing the act of transporting a minor for commercial sex
acts,67 Congress has demonstrated its intolerance of sex trafficking
and those who commit such a crime.
2. Conduct Prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1591
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, Congress deemed two separate types
of conduct a sex-trafficking crime.68  Thus, under § 1591, there are
two disjunctive conduct elements.69  18 U.S.C. § 1591 prohibits an
actor from (1) knowingly transporting a victim into sexual slavery
or (2) knowingly profiting from a venture in which this transporta-
tion occurs.70  Hence, law enforcement can hold a person criminally
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a).
60. See ROBINSON, supra note 58, at 124 (discussing the four different levels of
criminal culpability and how “purpose” is more stringent than “knowledge”).
61. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text.
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (requiring intent).
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., Chris Martin & Joe Ryan, Super-Cheap Driverless Cabs to Kick
Mass Transit to the Curb, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 25, 2016), https://bloom.bg/2hElxgz.
66. See infra notes 73–84 and accompanying text.
67. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).
68. United States v. Moss, 379 F. App’x 651, 653 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) and (2) are two separate actions); see also United States v.
King, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1218 (D. Haw. 2010) (finding that Congress intended
for 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) and (2) to create two alternative means of committing
one offense).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (2).
70. Id. § 1591(a).  Section 1591 provides in relevant part:
Whoever knowingly
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liable for either transporting a victim (hereinafter “firsthand con-
duct”)71 or profiting from participating in a venture that engages in
sex trafficking (hereinafter “secondhand conduct”).72
By enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1591, Congress intentionally criminal-
ized a broad range of activities.73  Congress decried how “[n]o com-
prehensive law exists in the United States that penalizes the range
of offenses involved in the [sex] trafficking scheme.”74  Accord-
ingly, Congress crafted a statute that criminalized seemingly inno-
cent actions75 to prevent traffickers from “[escaping] deserved
punishment.”76
Unlike 18 U.S.C. § 1111,77 which criminalizes “the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought,”78 the acts
criminalized by § 1591 are not inherently evil.79  And yet, “nothing
about what this statute proscribes is left to the imagination,”80 be-
cause the purposes of the TVPA limit the scope of the conduct pro-
hibited by § 1591.81  Congress enacted the TVPA “to combat
trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery
whose victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure
just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their vic-
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . transports . . . by
any means a person; or
(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from partici-
pation in a venture which has engaged in an act in violation of para-
graph (1), knowing, or . . . in reckless disregard of the fact, that means
of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion . . . or any combination of
such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial
sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will
be caused to engage in a commercial sex act . . . .
Id.
71. Id. § 1591(a)(1).
72. Id. § 1591(a)(2).
73. United States v. Estrada-Tepal, 57 F. Supp. 3d 164, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)
(“[E]xpansiveness was a legislative goal in enacting the statute.”).
74. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(14) (2018).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (prohibiting the following acts: recruiting, enticing, har-
boring, transporting, providing, obtaining, advertising, maintaining, patronizing, or
soliciting).
76. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(14).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2018).
78. Id. § 1111(a).
79. United States v. Estrada-Tepal, 57 F. Supp. 3d 164, 169 (E.D.N.Y 2014)
(noting that the actions listed under § 1591(a) include “seemingly harmless con-
duct” within their scope).
80. United States v. Wilson, No. 10-60102-CR-ZLOCH/ROSENBAUM, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75149, at *25 (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2010).
81. See United States v. Thompson, 141 F. Supp. 3d 188, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(finding that the intent of the TVPA clarifies the parameters of the prohibited
conduct).
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tims.”82  The law prohibits the listed actions only if the actor knew
about or recklessly disregarded the existence of planned sex traf-
ficking.83  Thus, it is the mens rea requirement of § 1591 that pre-
vents the prosecution of innocent transporters.84
3. Results Prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1591
The construction of § 1591 further illustrates the limited scope
of the prohibited conduct.85  Section 1591 has two disjunctive con-
duct elements.86  The requisite mens rea for these conduct elements
is “knowingly.”87  Section 1591 also has two disjunctive result ele-
ments.88  One result criminalizes the use of force, threats of force,
fraud, coercion, or a combination of those means to cause the vic-
tim to engage in a commercial sex act (hereinafter the “forced sex
result”).89  The other result criminalizes the scenario where a perpe-
trator causes a victim under 18-years-old to engage in a commercial
sex act (hereinafter the “child prostitution result”).90  The actor’s
conduct must either cause one of these results or support a plan to
cause one of these results for the actor to satisfy the result element
of sex trafficking under § 1591.91
These two result elements each have two mens rea options:
“knowing” or “in reckless disregard of the fact.”92  To convict an
actor for sex trafficking, a court must find that the actor performed
the act knowingly93 and acted either (1) knowingly or in reckless
82. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2018) (providing the purpose of the TVPA).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2018) (requiring that the actor know or recklessly
disregard the fact that the victim “will be caused” to engage in commercial sexual
activity).
84. Id.; see United States v. Richards, No. S1 13-CR-818(LAK), 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 105659, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2014) (rejecting the defendant’s
argument that the statute is overbroad and would allow prosecution of a taxi driver
who merely drives a prostitute to the police station after witnessing a fight with the
prostitute and her pimp).
85. See United States v. Estrada-Tepal, 57 F. Supp. 3d 164, 168 (E.D.N.Y.
2014) (clarifying the elements of the statute under a plain reading); United States
v. Vanderhorst, 2 F. Supp. 3d 792, 799–800 (D. S.C. 2014) (discussing the grammat-
ical structure of the result element of the statute).
86. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § CRM 227, http:/
/bit.ly/2D20AFM (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (providing instructions for how U.S.
attorneys should litigate statutes with disjunctive elements).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (“Whoever knowingly —”); see supra Part II.B.2.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. (listing the two different results with “or” in between).
92. Id.; see also United States v. Banker, 876 F.3d 530, 535–36 (4th Cir. 2017)
(holding that the two mens rea options apply to both results).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (2) (listing the two types of conduct prohibited
under § 1591); see United States v. Wearing, 865 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2017) (dis-
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disregard of the fact of the forced sex result or (2) knowingly or in
reckless disregard of the fact of the child prostitution result.94
4. The Different Mens Rea Required for the Prohibited Results
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1591
An actor must knowingly perform the prohibited act to satisfy
the conduct element of § 1591.  To satisfy the result element of
§ 1591, the actor must have acted with the requisite mens rea based
on the information available to him at the time of the action.95  Ac-
cordingly, courts will examine what information the actor either
knew96 or recklessly disregarded97 at the time of the action.98
Regarding the first mens rea option, the construction of § 1591
makes it appear as though § 1591 prohibits conduct only if the actor
knew the future when he acted.99  However, the federal circuit
courts have provided clarity as to what an actor must know for law
enforcement to find him criminally liable under § 1591.100  Rather
than a prescient certainty of the future, the statute requires that
“the defendant know in the sense of being aware of an established
modus operandi that will in the future cause a person to engage in
prostitution.”101  Additionally, the future-tense of “will be caused”
indicates that an actor can still incur liability even when the sex act
cussing how the conduct element and the result element require showing two dif-
ferent types of knowledge).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).
95. See id. (requiring that the actor either have known or recklessly disre-
garded that the result would occur).
96. United States v. Valenzuela, 495 F. App’x 817, 820 (9th Cir. 2012) (clarify-
ing that the actor must have the requisite knowledge at the time of his action).
97. United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that
the actor must know or recklessly disregard the fact of the result when he acts).
98. See United States v. Willoughby, 742 F.3d 229, 241 (6th Cir. 2014) (clarify-
ing that the defendant’s criminal act occurred when he dropped the victim off
where her client was waiting, and not when sexual conduct occurred).
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).
100. E.g., United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If ‘to
know’ is taken in the sense of being sure of an established fact, no one ‘knows’ his
own or anyone else’s future.”); United States v. Tutstone, 525 F. App’x 298, 304
(6th Cir. 2013) (finding that the statute does not equate “knowledge” with cer-
tainty of the future); United States v. Roy, 630 F. App’x 169, 171 (4th Cir. 2015)
(finding that the statute requires “knowing” in the same way that common sense
dictates).
101. Todd, 627 F.3d at 334; see also United States v. Wearing, 865 F.3d 553,
556 (7th Cir. 2017) (clarifying that “know” refers to the plan for the victim at the
time of the action).
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does not occur.102  What is essential is that the actor knew, at the
time of his action, that this event was planned to happen.103
The second mens rea option is less demanding because it re-
quires only that the actor disregard a risk that something will hap-
pen, not that he knows the future.104  An actor acts with reckless
disregard when he takes action despite the fact that he has reason
to believe one of the two prohibited results will occur.105  For exam-
ple, to find that an actor recklessly disregarded the child prostitu-
tion result, courts will consider the following:  information the
victim provided to the actor, questionable documentation, and the
actor’s knowledge of the “victim’s grade level, or activities in which
the victim engaged.”106
In addition to these two mens rea options, § 1591(c) supplies
an alternative method of satisfying the elements of sex trafficking.
Section 1591(c) provides that the prosecution must prove neither
reckless disregard nor knowledge if it can prove that the defendant
had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim.107  Courts
have found that an actor had such a reasonable opportunity to ob-
serve the victim when he had sex with the victim or spent a period
of time in close proximity to the victim.108  By providing this alter-
native, Congress intended to lessen the Government’s burden of
proving the actor’s awareness of the victim’s age beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.109
102. United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2013) (find-
ing that the text of § 1591 supports the inference that a sex act need not occur).
103. Todd, 627 F.3d at 334 (“The knowledge required of the defendant is such
that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to
cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.”).  For an example of
how prosecutors may prove the knowledge of the defendant solely by testimony of
the victim, see United States v. Williams, 428 F. App’x 134, 140 (3d Cir. 2011).
104. 18 U.S.C § 1591(a).
105. See United States v. Wilson, No. 10-60102-CR-ZLOCH/ROSENBAUM,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75149, at *17 (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2010) (“Reckless disregard
means to ‘be aware of, but consciously and carelessly ignore, [certain] facts and
circumstances . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Pina-Suarez, 280 F. App’x 813,
817–18 (11th Cir. 2008))).
106. United States v. Phea, 755 F.3d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 2014).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) (“In a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which
the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the [victim] . . . the Gov-
ernment need not prove that the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the
fact, that the [victim] had not attained the age of 18 years.”); see United States v.
Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 31–32 (2d Cir. 2011) (describing the role of subsection (c)).
108. United States v. Davis, No. CR-14-76, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141754, at
*14 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2015); United States v. Rivera, No. 13-CR-149(KAM), 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157936, at *72–73 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2015).
109. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 34 (providing a thorough account of the legis-
lative history of the addition of § 1591(c)).
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C. Autonomous Transporters for Sex Trafficking
Because AVs will remove humans from the driver’s seat, courts
and legislators will need to redefine how existing laws will apply to
AVs.110  In an AV-dominated future, people will no longer have
physical control over each movement of their vehicles.111  No vehi-
cle available for purchase is currently at level five automation;112
thus, human drivers are still responsible when self-driving cars
crash.113  For example, in the wake of a deadly crash involving the
use of the Tesla Autopilot,114 the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) determined that the human driver was
responsible for the crash rather than the car.115  Even though the
car had full control of the vehicle when it crashed, the NHTSA
faulted the human driver because the Autopilot feature requires
that the human driver pay attention and remain ready to re-take
control.116
1. Applying Current Sex Trafficking Laws to AVs and AV
Manufacturers
As the law now stands, AVs117 and AV manufacturers118 will
escape criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 because both will
110. Dorothy J. Glancy, Autonomous and Automated and Connected Cars—
Oh My! First Generation Autonomous Cars in the Legal Ecosystem, 16 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 619, 662 (2015) (arguing that the creation of AVs should result in a
reconsideration of criminal laws); K.C. Webb, Products Liability and Autonomous
Vehicles: Who’s Driving Whom?, 23 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 48 (2017) (proposing a
“reasonable car standard” for tort law and arguing that car manufacturers should
be liable when their AVs fail).
111. E.g., Waymo Tech, supra note 5 (describing how Google’s driverless car
has no pedal or steering wheels).
112. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text.
113. See Steven Seidenberg, Who’s to Blame When Self-Driving Cars Crash?,
A.B.A. J. (July 2017), http://bit.ly/2FOMg5r (“The law, as it stands now, is simple.
Human beings cannot delegate driving responsibility to their cars.”).
114. Yadron & Tynan, supra note 18 (describing the circumstances of the first
fatal crash in a Tesla using autopilot mode).
115. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PE
16-007, ODI Resume 11 (2017), http://bit.ly/2FQ5xDr.
116. Id. (clarifying how there was no defect with the car’s self-driving function
because the driver was not correctly monitoring the car); see Model S, supra note
17 (describing the capabilities of AutoPilot).
117. See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Opinion Letter in Response to Google’s Inter-
pretation Request (Feb. 4, 2016), http://bit.ly/2FRP15Q (explaining the regulations
where the NHTSA will consider the self-driving car to be the “driver” of the
vehicle).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2018) (criminalizing “whoever” transports another);
1 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (“[T]he word[ ] . . . ‘whoever’ include[s] corporations, compa-
nies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well
as individuals.”).
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lack an awareness of the result element—sex trafficking—even if
they both satisfy the conduct elements.  With regard to these con-
duct elements, § 1591 currently prohibits transporting a victim into
sex slavery119 or profiting from a venture that engages in sex traf-
ficking.120  An AV can perform the first prohibited act when it
transports a victim into sex slavery by carrying him or her from
Point A to Point B;121  the AV will do so knowingly because it will
know that it is carrying passengers to a destination.122  Thus, the
AV’s action will satisfy both the objective and subjective require-
ments of the firsthand conduct element.123
On the other hand, the ride-sharing AV manufacturer can per-
form the second prohibited act when it earns a profit from a ride in
which one of its AVs transported passengers from one place to an-
other.124  The ride-sharing AV manufacturer will knowingly profit
when its AV transports passengers from Point A to Point B.125
Thus, the ride-sharing AV manufacturer’s action will satisfy both
the objective and subjective requirements of the secondhand con-
duct element.126  A manufacturer who makes AVs for personal
ownership will also satisfy the objective and subjective require-
ments of the secondhand conduct element, but only insofar as it will
knowingly profit from the sale of an AV to a sex trafficker.127
AVs and AV manufacturers will escape criminal liability128
under § 1591 because they lack the mens rea required by the result
element.129  To be liable for sex trafficking under § 1591, an actor
must, at the time of his action, know or recklessly disregard the fact
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) (firsthand conduct).
120. Id. § 1591(a)(2) (secondhand conduct).
121. Id. § 1591(a)(1) (prohibiting transporting a victim).
122. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (discussing what the AV
will know when it transports passengers).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) (prohibiting the knowing transport of a victim).
124. Id. § 1591(a)(2) (prohibiting profiting from a venture that engages in sex
trafficking).
125. See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text (discussing the ride-shar-
ing version of the future).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) (prohibiting knowingly profiting from a venture
that engages in sex trafficking).
127. Even though automobile manufacturers do collect information about
their customers, the information collected does not tell the manufacturer what pur-
pose the vehicle is being used for. E.g., Privacy Statement, GEN. MOTORS, https://
www.gm.com/privacy-statement.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
128. See John W. Zipp, Note, The Road Will Never Be the Same: A Reexami-
nation of Tort Liability for Autonomous Vehicles, 43 TRANSP. L.J. 137, 162–80
(2016) (arguing that AVs should be treated as the equivalent of a human driver
under the law for liability in tort).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (requiring that the actor know or recklessly disre-
gard the fact of the forced sex result or the fact of the child prostitution result).
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of the forced sex result130 or the fact of the child prostitution re-
sult.131  When an AV performs the firsthand conduct, the only infor-
mation available to the AV about its occupants will be:  (1) the
number of passengers it transported and (2) the pick-up and drop-
off locations.132  The AV will not know the trafficker’s desired fate
for his victim before the AV drops her off at her destination and
will not know the age of the victim or her trafficker without the
facial-recognition technology that this Comment proposes.133
Therefore, the AV will lack sufficient information to form knowl-
edge of or reckless disregard for either result.134  Thus, the AV will
not satisfy the second element of sex trafficking under § 1591 and
will escape criminal liability.135
Similarly, both types of AV manufacturers will lack sufficient
information to form knowledge or reckless disregard for either re-
sult element.136  A trafficker will use an AV to transport a victim for
sex trafficking.  But the only information available to the ride-shar-
ing AV manufacturer will be: (1) the name of the person who or-
dered the vehicle, (2) that person’s phone number and credit card
information, (3) the number of passengers, and (4) the pick-up and
drop-off locations.137  If car companies continue collecting data the
way that they currently do, then manufacturers of AVs for personal
ownership will only know: (1) personal details about the purchaser
130. Supra notes 88–98 and accompanying text.
131. Supra notes 88–98 and accompanying text.
132. This is an example of the type of information that ride-sharing compa-
nies like Uber receive from customers.  See Privacy Policy, UBER,  http://privacy.
uber.com/policy (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (describing the information Uber
collects).
133. A recent 360-video uploaded to the Waymo website exemplifies the type
of information that an AV obtains as it drives along the road to its destination.
This video demonstrates that an AV will absorb information from its surroundings
with the sole goal of safely navigating the road.  Waymo is not designing its AV to
make predictions about what its passengers will do when they arrive at their desti-
nation. Waymo Tech, supra note 5; see also David King, Note, Putting the Reins on
Autonomous Vehicle Liability: Why Horse Accidents Are the Best Common Law
Analogy, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 127, 145–59 (2017), http://bit.ly/2NQumGd (arguing
that because horses and AVs obtain and process information in a similar manner,
they should be treated similarly in modern jurisprudence).
134. Supra Part II.B.4.  The author acknowledges that her conclusion inher-
ently assumes that AVs will even have the ability to form mens rea.  The author
also acknowledges that it is impossible to know for certain what level of cognition
AVs will have.  Thus, the author’s argument should be construed as if AVs will
have the ability to form mens rea.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2018).
136. See id.
137. See Privacy Policy, supra note 132.
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of the vehicle and (2) the vehicle’s movements.138  Therefore, be-
cause the AV manufacturer will lack sufficient information to either
know or recklessly disregard both of the result elements, it will es-
cape criminal liability under § 1591.139
In addition, neither the AV nor the AV manufacturer will sat-
isfy the requirements of the alternative method of criminal liability
under § 1591(c), namely the “reasonable opportunity to view” the
victim.140  Currently, projected AV models do not have cameras in-
side the passenger compartment.141  And because the AV will not
have an opportunity to view its passenger compartment, there is
also no way for the AV manufacturer to have a reasonable opportu-
nity to observe the victim.142  Accordingly, neither AVs nor AV
manufacturers will satisfy the elements of sex trafficking under
§ 1591.
2. Congress Reaffirms Its Commitment to Combatting Complicity
in Sex Trafficking
Recently, attention to sex-trafficking has focused on the In-
ternet’s role in facilitating such crimes.143  Prosecutors have histori-
cally been unsuccessful in charging the owners of websites that sex
traffickers use to facilitate sex trafficking.144  For example, in Janu-
ary 2017, the State of California filed felony charges against
Backpage.com’s CEO for money laundering and pimping of a mi-
nor.145  Backpage.com enabled online sex trafficking by allowing
pimps to post ads of their “goods.”146  Despite evidence of the web-
site’s use in child sex-trafficking,147 the court dismissed 13 state
138. See Privacy Statement, supra note 127; Peter Holley, Big Brother on
Wheels: Why Your Car Company May Know More About You than Your Spouse,
WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2018), https://wapo.st/2Jgdsv2 (discussing how car companies
collect data on the movement of vehicles).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c).
141. See, e.g., Davies, Mercedes Robo-Car, supra note 26.
142. See, e.g., id.
143. E.g., Shoshana Walter, Online Sex Trade Is Flourishing Despite Efforts to
Curb It, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2012), http://nyti.ms/2xe6Mva; Timothy Williams,
Backpage’s Sex Ads Are Gone. Child Trafficking? Hardly., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11,
2017), http://nyti.ms/2md5nvu.
144. Darrell Smith, Money Laundering Charges Against Backpage.com Execs
Can Proceed, Judge Rules, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Smith,
Money Laundering Charges Can Proceed], http://bit.ly/2zZ35b7.
145. Complaint at 2–18, State v. Ferrer, No. 16FE024013, 2016 WL 7884408
(Cal. Super. Ct. 2016).
146. Williams, supra note 143; see also U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME,
GLOBAL REPORT ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 27 (2016), http://bit.ly/2F5rAFm.
147. Williams, supra note 143.
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pimping charges.148  Consequently, the executives of Backpage.com
will not face charges for their involvement in online sex
trafficking.149
Federal lawmakers, however, took a stand against companies
who remain complicit when perpetrators use their product to facili-
tate sex trafficking.  In a new law, the Allow States and Victims to
Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017150 (FOSTA), the Senate
recognized that websites that enable sex-trafficking are undeserving
of the civil immunities151 currently provided to “interactive com-
puter services providers”152 under the Communications Decency
Act.153  Tech companies originally pushed back against FOSTA.154
However, after months of pressure, these companies agreed to sup-
port the bill.155
148. State v. Ferrer, No. 16FE024013, 2016 WL 6905743, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct.
2016) (demurring the defendants’ 13 pimping charges because the Communica-
tions Decency Act provides online providers immunity for republishing, on their
website, content generated by a third party); Smith, Money Laundering Charges
Can Proceed, supra note 144.
149. Ferrer, 2016 WL 6905743, at *6.
150. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017,
Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230 and in scat-
tered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
151. Id. § 2.  As Senator Bill Nelson noted:
These shady and these highly profitable website operators know full well
how their sites are being used. What is more, they are hiding behind a
decades-old legal shield to immunize themselves from prosecution. We
have to change that legal shield that was set up a decade ago for a differ-
ent purpose.
164 CONG. REC. S1857 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2018).
152. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2018). Section 230(f)(2) provides:
The term “interactive computer service” means any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a ser-
vice or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems oper-
ated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.
Id.
153. The Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). See generally Ryan J.P. Dyer,
Comment, The Communication Decency Act Gone Wild: A Case for Renewing the
Presumption Against Preemption, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 837 (2014) (arguing that
courts applying § 230 immunity should reexamine Congress’s intentions for the
scope of the preemptive effect of § 230).
154. Nicholas Kristof, Google and Sex Traffickers Like Backpage.com, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2xRg2Cs (describing tech companies’ opposi-
tion to a bill that ultimately became part of the FOSTA).
155. Cecilia Kang, In Reversal, Tech Companies Back Sex Trafficking Bill,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2j1qaW9. But see Ali Breland, Five Reg-
ulatory Fights Facing Tech in 2018, HILL (Jan. 1, 2018), http://bit.ly/2FZ2h8I
(describing how tech companies lobbied Congress to limit their liability).
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The Communications Decency Act allowed tech companies to
escape civil and criminal penalties even when they knowingly per-
mitted perpetrators to use their websites to facilitate sex traffick-
ing.156  FOSTA enables individuals to bring civil actions against
tech companies who continue to facilitate such conduct.157  Further,
FOSTA establishes federal criminal liability for actors who “facili-
tate” sex trafficking.158  Additionally, FOSTA allows state attorneys
general, acting as parens patriae, to bring civil actions on behalf of
the residents of their states.159
While the federal government is taking steps against online sex
traffickers with FOSTA, local law enforcement agencies are also
changing how they treat victims of sex trafficking.160  In the past,
law enforcement officers arrested trafficking victims for prostitu-
tion rather than pimps for sex trafficking.161  Acknowledging this
injustice, federal agencies have led a recent nationwide push to in-
vest resources in training both state and federal officers how to
identify and assist victims of sex trafficking.162
Advances in technology hindered law enforcement agencies in
the fight against sex trafficking,163 but now law enforcement agen-
cies are adapting more effectively.164  Because of FOSTA, law en-
forcement agencies can now punish those who merely “facilitate”
sex trafficking.165  AVs, however, will present a new set of issues for
156. See 164 CONG. REC. S1853 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2018) (statement of Sen.
Heitkamp) (“No law should put anyone above liability if they are actively involved
and complicit in selling children for sex.”).
157. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017,
Pub L. No. 115-164 §§ 3(a), 4(a), 132 Stat. 1253, 1254 (2018) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 230 and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (allowing harmed individuals to bring
civil actions and removing immunity for website owners).
158. Id. § 5 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1591).
159. Id. § 6(a) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1595).
160. See Steve Volk, Police Are Trained to Spot Drunken Driving and Drug
Trafficking. Why Not Child Trafficking, Too?, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2018), http://
wapo.st/2CSyThK.
161. See id.; INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CONFRONTING
COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND SEX TRAFFICKING OF MINORS IN THE
UNITED STATES 14 (2013) (describing how police departments are just now begin-
ning to move away from arresting young victims of sex trafficking for the crime of
prostitution).
162. See Human Trafficking/Involuntary Servitude, FBI, http://bit.ly/2G0h4Qv
(last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
163. See Walter, supra note 143.
164. See, e.g., Rod Rosenstein, Getting Tough on Sex Traffickers, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 19, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2FXIW84.
165. See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of
2017, Pub L. No. 115-164 § 5, 132 Stat. 1253, 1255 (2018) (codified in 47 U.S.C.
§ 230 and scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); see also Nick Bilton, Silicon Valley Mur-
der Mystery: How Drugs and Paranoia Doomed Silk Road, VANITY FAIR (May
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lawmakers and law enforcement.166  Victims of sex trafficking
should not have to wait another 17 years167 for lawmakers to ad-
dress the technological advancements that will make sex trafficking
easier.168
Even with the passage of FOSTA, AV manufacturers will still
not be criminally liable when traffickers use their AVs to transport
a victim for sex trafficking.  FOSTA adds “facilitating, assisting, and
supporting” to the definition of “participation in a venture” under
18 U.S.C. § 1591.169  However, for a court to impose criminal liabil-
ity, § 1591 requires an AV manufacturer to knowingly participate in
a venture that engages in sex trafficking.170  Even in the ride-shar-
ing version of the future,171 AV manufacturers still will not know-
ingly benefit from sex trafficking because they will not know the
purpose of the ride.172  Thus, Congress should impose new criminal
penalties for a manufacturer’s failure to include facial-recognition
technology in their AVs.173  As the next section demonstrates, this
Comment’s Proposed Legislation would not be the first time Con-
gress used the threat of criminal penalties to compel companies to
be proactive.
D. Previous Examples of when Congress Used the Threat of
Criminal Penalties to Compel Companies to Be
Proactive
Generally, two types of legal remedies deter misconduct:  crim-
inal liability and civil penalties.174  Society has been hesitant to im-
pose criminal liability on conduct that does not, at first glance,
2017), http://bit.ly/2Akk0b9 (describing one instance where a federal court found a
website “manufacturer” criminally liable for the dangerous ways people used his
website).
166. See supra Part II.D.1–2.
167. The TVPA was enacted in 2000 and FOSTA was introduced in 2017.
168. See 164 CONG. REC. S1857 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2018) (statement of Sen.
Nelson) (“[B]ut now when technology advances, you have to be on your guard
about how new technology is used for the bad operators.”).
169. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 § 5
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e) by adding a definition for “participation in a
venture”).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) (2018) (prohibiting “knowingly” benefitting from
participation in a venture that has engaged in sex trafficking).
171. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 124–42 and accompanying text.
173. See supra Part II.C.1 (applying the current sex trafficking laws to AVs
and AV manufacturers).
174. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It
Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1492–93 (1996) (comparing criminal and civil
liability).
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appear to be evil.175  However, Congress has used the threat of
criminal penalties to compel manufacturers to proactively prohibit
dangerous uses of their products and to ultimately deter miscon-
duct.176  The following two sections provide examples of such
instances.
1. The Consumer Products Safety Act
Congress has previously criminalized a manufacturer’s failure
to make its products safer.  For the past 40 years, the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC) has promulgated and enforced
the safety standards of consumer products.177  In 1972, Congress
passed the Consumer Product Safety Act178 (“Product Safety Act
I”), to “protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury associ-
ated with consumer products.”179  At that time, a fragmented sys-
tem of federal consumer product safety legislation addressed
different products with different statutes.180  In response to this
haphazard statutory scheme, Congress enacted the Product Safety
Act I to “develop uniform safety standards for consumer products
and to minimize conflicting state and local regulations.”181
While the Product Safety Act I efficiently functioned for sev-
eral decades, it needed an update by the turn of the century.182  In
2007, children’s toy manufacturers recalled millions of toys made
with lead paint.183  This major recall prompted Congress to review
and strengthen provisions of the Product Safety Act I and provide
the CPSC with more resources.184  To fix the problems of the Prod-
175. See, e.g., Ariel Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Con-
stitutionalism of Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 340–41 (1999) (providing exam-
ples of when criminal liability is not appropriate).
176. Infra Part II.D.1–2.
177. Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2053 (2018) (establishing the
CPSC).
178. Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207
(1972) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 2050–2089 (2018)).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 2051(a)(3) (2018).
180. Id. § 2051(a)(4)–(5) (citing ineffective state and local regulations and in-
adequate federal regulations as reasons for enacting the Product Safety Act I).
181. Id. § 2051(b)(3).
182. See 154 CONG. REC. E1670-04 (daily ed. July 30, 2008) (statement of
Rep. Conyers, Jr.) (pointing to the “regulatory embarrassment” of recalling 30 mil-
lion toys and 15 million child products because of safety concerns as reason for
amending the Product Safety Act I).
183. See id.; Louise Story & David Barboza, Mattel Recalls 19 Million Toys
Sent from China, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2007), https://nyti.ms/2k4fW38 (explaining
the gravity of the lead paint problem).
184. See 154 CONG. REC. E1709-01 (daily ed. July 30, 2008) (statement of
Rep. Holt) (“The events of the past year have demonstrated the danger that
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uct Safety Act I, Congress enacted the Consumer Product Safety
Improvement Act of 2008185 (“Product Safety Act II”).
The Product Safety Act II broadened the range of prohibited
activities186 and increased penalties for engaging in a prohibited ac-
tivity.187  The Product Safety Act II more than doubled the number
of prohibited acts.188  Additionally, the Product Safety Act II in-
creased the severity of the criminal penalties for violating the pro-
hibited activities.189  In deciding to strengthen the provisions of
Product Safety Act I, Congress cited the CPSC’s need for “better
enforcement tools, including the power to impose higher penalties,
so that the penalty for manufacturing or selling an unsafe product
will act as a real deterrent to wrongdoing and not be simply dis-
missed as a cost of doing business.”190
Before the passage of the Product Safety Act II, manufacturers
recalled over 150 children’s toys; around 20 of those recalls were
because of lead paint.191  By 2017, after Congress imposed the
threat of criminal liability, manufacturers recalled only 28 children’s
toys, none of which were recalled because of lead paint.192
The lead-paint-covered toys were dangerous only when in-
gested; similarly, AVs present the dangers described in this Com-
ment only when used by pimps to transport victims for sex
trafficking.193  In other words, the danger from both AVs and lead-
paint-covered toys comes from the product’s misuse.194  Congress
knew that lead-paint-covered toys were dangerous only when chil-
American consumers face when the government does not give regulatory agencies
the tools they need in order to protect consumers from unsafe products.”).
185. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-314,
122 Stat. 3016 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 2068 (2018).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 2070 (2018).
188. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 2068 (prohibiting 16 distinct actions), with Con-
sumer Product Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 19, 86 Stat. 1207, 1224
(1972) (prohibiting seven distinct actions).
189. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 2070 (criminalizing an actor’s conduct based on
strict liability, listing the possible imprisonment as five years, and imposing an ad-
ditional potential punishment of asset forfeiture), with Consumer Product Safety
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 21, 86 Stat. 1207, 1225 (criminalizing an actor’s
“knowing[ ]” and “willful[ ]” conduct, listing the possible imprisonment time as
one year, and not imposing any provisions for asset forfeiture).
190. H.R. REP. No. 110-501, at 21 (2007) (emphasis added).
191. Toy Recall Statistics, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION,
http://bit.ly/ToyRecallStats (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
192. Id.
193. See Lead in Toys and Toy Jewelry, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://bit.ly/2OCCmId (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (describing the dangers of lead
paint).
194. Id. (describing how lead poisoning occurs when lead paint is ingested).
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dren misused these toys.195  And yet, Congress still increased the
criminal penalties available for a children’s toy manufacturer who
violates the prohibition of lead paint.196  Similarly, Congress should
compel AV manufacturers to implement facial-recognition technol-
ogy in their AVs with the threat of criminal liability to prohibit sex
traffickers from misusing AVs.
2. The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act
It is an accepted practice for Congress to compel corporations
to take proactive measures with the threat of criminal penalties.  In
1970, Congress passed the Currency and Foreign Transactions Re-
porting Act (“Reporting Act”),197 requiring banks to maintain
records that have a “high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or
regulatory investigations or proceedings.”198  An officer of a bank
that “willfully” violates one of the regulations imposed by the Re-
porting Act will be subject to a fine up to $1,000, or sentenced to up
to one year in prison, or both.199  While minimal for a large finan-
cial institution, the penalty indicates Congress’s willingness to im-
pose criminal penalties on corporations who do not take proactive
measures to combat crime.200
Similar to the projected role of AVs, banks are essential fix-
tures in society.201  Congress can use the threat of criminal penalties
to require companies to be proactive in deterring the misuse of
their services.202  Congress has used the threat of criminal penalties
to compel banks to keep meticulous records in order to make it
easier to identify and combat illegal activity.203  Congress should
195. 154 CONG. REC. E1663-03 (daily ed. July 30, 2008) (statement of Hon.
Betty McCollum) (“Toy safety, which has been called ‘last year’s problem’ by the
toy industry, is still very much an urgent, current challenge.  Congress must act to
ensure that the products and toys our children are exposed to are free of toxins
and hazards.”).
196. See 15 U.S.C. § 2070 (2018) (listing the potential criminal penalties for
violations of the product safety standards).
197. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. 91-508, 84
Stat. 1118 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 18, 31 U.S.C.).
198. 12 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2018) (declaring the purpose of the Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act).
199. 12 U.S.C. § 1956 (prohibiting willful violations of §§ 1952 and 1953).
200. See In re Maycher, 301 A.D.2d 287, 288 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (describ-
ing how the defendant was convicted under § 1956 in the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey for failing to maintain records in his law practice and
was sentenced to one year’s probation and ordered to pay a $20,000 fine).
201. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, How Banks Could Control Gun Sales If Wash-
ington Won’t, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), http://nyti.ms/2BDLBE7 (describing
how easily banks could effectuate gun control if they wanted to).
202. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1956.
203. See 12 U.S.C. § 1951(b).
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again use the threat of criminal penalties to compel AV manufac-
turers to include facial-recognition technology in their AVs to iden-
tify and save victims of sex trafficking.
III. ANALYSIS
As the preceding section demonstrates, Congress has deemed
the threat of criminal liability necessary to compel manufacturers to
be proactive and assist in deterring certain types of dangerous activ-
ity.  The threat of criminal liability has been successful in these con-
texts.  And much like these previous instances, threatening criminal
liability for an AV manufacturer’s failure to implement facial-recog-
nition technology is justified by the horrendous nature of the crime
that the technology will combat:  sex trafficking.
The following section examines how civil penalties are insuffi-
cient to deter corporate misconduct.  The remainder of Part III
evinces the consequences of overburdening a regulatory agency and
concludes by suggesting the structure of the law Congress should
pass to criminalize an AV manufacturer’s failure to implement fa-
cial-recognition technology.
A. The Threat of Civil Litigation Is Insufficient to Protect
Victims of Sex Trafficking in the Era of AVs
Theoretically, civil liability is the appropriate avenue for hold-
ing an AV manufacturer liable when a trafficker uses an AV in fur-
therance of sex trafficking.204  Practically, however, civil liability is
an insufficient deterrent mechanism for corporate misconduct.205
Civil liability does not adequately deter misconduct because large
corporations see no difference between civil damages and the rou-
tine costs of doing business.206  And, as one mother, whose daugh-
204. Cf. Jeffrey R. Zohn, Note, When Robots Attack: How Should the Law
Handle Self-Driving Cars that Cause Damages, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y
461, 484 (2015) (arguing that states should deal with AVs similar to how they deal
with autopilot or elevators).
205. See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, Carrots and Sticks: Placing Re-
wards as well as Punishment in Regulatory and Tort Law, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
315, 337 (2014) (arguing that it would be a more effective incentive than the fear of
punishment to provide companies with a compliance defense to the harsh penalties
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
206. David F. Drake & Robin L. Just, Ignore, Avoid Abandon, and Embrace:
What Drives Firm Responses to Environmental Regulation, in ENVIRONMENTALLY
RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAINS 199, 203 (Atalay Atasu ed., 2016) (“In deciding how
to respond to enacted regulation, profit-maximizing firms will weigh the expected
cost of compliance against the expected cost of noncompliance.”).
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ter was trafficked online at the age of 15, remarked:  “our children
can’t be the cost of doing business.”207
The following two case studies highlight incidents where civil
liability was an insufficient deterrent.  No criminal penalties existed
to force the companies to be proactive.  Therefore, the companies
continued to engage in harmful behavior despite the risk of civil
liability.
1. Case Study of the Takata Airbags Recall
The recent recall of automobiles made with Takata airbags pro-
vides one example of the ineffectiveness of civil liability in cur-
tailing dangerous conduct among automobile manufacturers.208
Beginning in the early 2000s, automobile manufacturers installed
Takata airbags in their vehicles.209  By 2004, automobile manufac-
turers knew that these airbags were dangerous.210  Nevertheless, au-
tomobile manufacturers continued to equip their vehicles with the
less expensive and more volatile Takata airbags.211  Finally, in 2008,
Honda issued the first recall on vehicles using Takata airbags.212  By
2014, Chrysler, Ford, Nissan, and Toyota had followed suit and is-
sued recalls for vehicles with Takata airbags:  a total of 10.9 million
vehicles.213
Because Takata made the airbag inflator with an inexpensive
compound, these airbags potentially can explode upon deploy-
ment.214  Despite this inherent danger, of which the automobile
manufacturers knew, the manufacturers saved money by using the
207. Kristof, supra note 154.
208. See Conor Dwyer Reynolds, The Role of Private Litigation in the Auto-
motive Recall Process, 29 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 121, 142–44 (2016) (explaining
the history of the Takata airbag recalls).
209. Hiroko Tabuchi, A Cheaper Airbag, and Takata’s Road to a Deadly Cri-
sis, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2bEQ6i1.
210. Hiroko Tabuchi & Neal E. Boudette, Automakers Knew of Takata
Airbag Hazard for Years, Suit Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2017) [hereinafter
Tabuchi & Boudette, Automakers Knew of Airbag Hazard], https://nyti.ms/
2mwMWTs (describing how Honda knew of the airbag inflator’s propensity to
rupture because of tests Honda had conducted on the airbags).
211. Tabuchi, supra note 209 (discussing how Takata airbags injure passengers
due to a degradation of the inflator compound, ammonium nitrate).
212. Reynolds, supra note 208, at 143.
213. Id. To date, 42 million vehicles have been recalled.  Kelly Couturier &
Hiroko Tabuchi, The Airbag in Your Car Could Explode. This Is What You Should
Do About It., N.Y. TIMES, http://nyti.ms/2k1rT9I (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
214. See Couturier & Tabuchi, supra note 213 (describing the cause and man-
ner of the possible explosion of a Takata airbag).
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Takata airbags.215  As a result, the defective airbags have killed 23
and injured over 250 people worldwide.216
Injured individuals filed a class action lawsuit in federal district
court against Takata and six automobile manufacturers.217  Shortly
thereafter, the plaintiffs began settlement negotiations with four of
the six automobile manufacturers.218  Eventually, those four auto-
mobile manufacturers agreed to pay a total of $553 million.219
On its face, the settlement agreement appeared to punish the
automobile manufacturers for their use of the airbags and compen-
sate the affected consumers.220  However, the settlement funds did
not even cover the costs of injuries caused by the airbags;  these
funds reimbursed the plaintiffs for litigation expenses, rental car
costs, and repair costs only.221  The amount of money each manu-
facturer paid in the settlement was negligible compared to how
much these companies make in a year.222  For example, in 2017,
Toyota made $3 billion from sales in North America alone.223
Toyota’s $278.5 million settlement agreement224 comprised a small
amount of its annual profit.225
Meanwhile, in connection with the faulty airbag issue, the
United States charged three Takata executives for wire fraud and
215. Tabuchi, supra note 209.
216. David Shepardson, Ford Agrees to $299.1 Million U.S. Takata Airbag
Settlement, REUTERS (July 16, 2018), https://reut.rs/2Oq1f9x.
217. In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., 84 F. Supp. 3d 1371, 1372
(J.P.M.L. 2015).
218. Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class Settlements, Preliminary Certification of Settlement Classes, and Approval
of Class Notices and Incorporated Memorandum of Law at 8, In re Takata Airbag
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 15-MD-02599, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76090 (S.D. Fla. May
18, 2017) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Settlements].
219. Id. at 10 (detailing the amounts Toyota, BMW, Subaru, and Mazda
agreed to pay); see also Neal E. Boudette, $553 Million Accord for U.S. Drivers
over Takata Airbags, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2qxO0L6.
220. Boudette, supra note 219.
221. Id.; see also Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settle-
ments, supra note 218, at 11; Shepardson, supra note 216 (describing Ford’s recent
settlement for costs associated with “economic loss”).
222. E.g., Mazda Ends Fiscal Year with Record Sales and Profits, MAZDA
(Apr. 27, 2016), http://bit.ly/2iujRaz (reporting that Mazda ended the 2015-2016
fiscal year with $1.71 billion operating profit).
223. Toyota Motor Corporation (TMC) Announces Financial Results for Fis-
cal Year Ended March 31, 2017, TOYOTA [hereinafter Toyota Motor Co.], https://
toyota.us/2wT0nTC (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
224. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlements, supra
note 218, at 10.
225. See Boudette, supra note 219; Toyota Motor Co., supra note 223.
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fabricating test data.226  The Takata executives pleaded guilty to the
criminal charges, and the court assessed Takata with fines totaling
one billion dollars.227  Because of the fines, Takata filed for
bankruptcy.228
While Takata remains bankrupt,229 the automobile manufac-
turers continue to thrive.230  In other words, criminal penalties thor-
oughly punished Takata for its part in the wrongdoing.231
Meanwhile, those same automobile manufacturers remain
operational.232
What’s more, these same companies are doing so well that they
are even striving to invent AVs.233  Thus, the Takata airbag recall
shows how civil liability inadequately deters misconduct by these
soon-to-be AV manufacturers.  Considering that sex trafficking is
akin to slavery,234 civil penalties cannot be the only way to deter
AV manufacturers from allowing traffickers to use their AVs to fur-
ther sex trafficking.
2. Case Study of Underground Gas Storage Tanks in California
The recent lawsuits that California filed against gas companies
are another example of how civil penalties are ineffective at deter-
ring misconduct.  In 2011, California brought a lawsuit against
Chevron for installing leak detection sensors too far from under-
ground storage tanks,235 a violation of the California Health and
Safety Code.236  The State settled the action with Chevron for
226. Indictment at 15–20, United States v. Tanaka, No. 2:16-cr-20810 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 7, 2016); Hiroko Tabuchi & Neal E. Boudette, 3 Takata Executives Face
Criminal Charges over Exploding Airbags, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017) [hereinafter
Tabuchi & Boudette, 3 Takata Executives], http://nyti.ms/2jB3fzh.
227. Plea Agreement at 9–15, United States v. Takata Corp., No. 16-CR-
20810 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2017); Tabuchi & Boudette, Automakers Knew of
Airbag Hazard, supra note 210.
228. Jonathan Soble, Takata, Unable to Overcome Airbag Crisis, Files for
Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2t6GesP.
229. Id.
230. Wayne Duggan, The 10 Most Valuable Auto Companies in the World,
U.S. NEWS (May 8, 2018), http://bit.ly/2Fbi1ZR.
231. See Soble, supra note 228.
232. But see NADA USED CAR GUIDE, THE IMPACT OF VEHICLE RECALLS
ON THE AUTOMOTIVE MARKET 11–16 (2013) (demonstrating how Toyota’s 2010
recall of some of its vehicles negatively affected Toyota’s competitive advantage
over other automobile companies, but not its overall ability to turn a profit).
233. See supra notes 20–27 and accompanying text.
234. E.g., NAT’L HUM. TRAFFICKING HOTLINE, supra note 10.
235. Complaint at 1, 5–11, State v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., No. RG11593515,
2011 WL 3922407 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 2, 2011).
236. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25291, 25299 (West 2018) (providing
the requirements for underground gas storage tanks).
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around $24.5 million.237  In 2013, California filed a lawsuit against
BP for violating those same provisions of the California Health and
Safety Code.238
Professors David F. Drake and Robin L. Just posit that BP
knew of the lawsuit against Chevron and yet, made no effort to be
proactive and correct its own misplaced sensors.239  Drake and Just
argue that BP found the potential costs of civil litigation more
favorable than the costs of fixing sensors for 780 underground
tanks.240  The fact that Chevron and California publicly settled their
action in 2011241 lends support to Drake and Just’s argument.242
The threat of a multimillion dollar settlement did not compel
BP to fix its leak detection sensors.243  In addition, had California
not filed a lawsuit, BP likely never would have fixed the sensors.244
The threat of monetary penalties was not grave enough to compel
BP to be proactive by fixing its sensors.245  Like the threat of a gas
leak, sex trafficking is a danger to our world.246  Accordingly, Con-
gress must provide a stronger mechanism to compel AV manufac-
turers to implement facial-recognition technology in their AVs.
B. The Threat of Regulatory Penalties Is Also Insufficient to
Protect Victims of Sex Trafficking in the Era of AVs
Regulatory penalties are another potential avenue to compel
AV manufacturers to implement facial-recognition technology.
However, as demonstrated by certain environmental regulations,
these penalties are also insufficient deterrent mechanisms.247  Sim-
ply stated, “[i]f the expected value of noncompliance is negative, we
237. Press Release, State of Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Kamala
D. Harris Announces Proposed $24.5 Million Settlement with Chevron Gas Sta-
tion and Tank Owners (Sept. 7, 2011), http://bit.ly/2ym4aeu.
238. Complaint at 1, 3–5, State v. BP W. Coast Prods., L.L.C., No.
RG13665900, 2013 WL 450366 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2013).
239. Drake & Just, supra note 206, at 207 (arguing that because BP was ac-
cused of violating the same regulations as Chevron, it is likely that the possible
penalty was an insufficient deterrent).
240. Id.
241. Press Release, State of Cal. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 237.
242. Drake & Just, supra note 206, at 207.
243. See Joshua E. Smith, State, Counties Settle with BP for $14 Million Over
Fuel Tank Violations, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Nov. 17, 2016), http://bit.ly/
CaliBPSettle.
244. See supra notes 239–43 and accompanying text.
245. See Drake & Just, supra note 206, at 207.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 1–4.
247. See Drake & Just, supra note 206, at 206–09.
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expect the rational polluter to comply with the law; if it is positive,
we expect the polluter to violate the law.”248
1. The Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig Disaster
The Deepwater Horizon disaster provides an example of how
regulatory penalties are insufficient to deter corporate miscon-
duct.249  In this disaster, BP’s oil rig sunk after the Macondo well
exploded and destroyed the oil rig’s drill.250  According to the gov-
ernment’s report on the incident, many of BP’s decisions saved the
company considerable time and money on the project; but these
decisions also increased the risk of the drill’s blowout.251  In a dis-
cussion about one of BP’s imprudent attempts to stabilize the
Macondo well, one of BP’s engineers sent an email stating:  “But,
who cares, it’s done, end of story, [we] will probably be fine.”252
Even though offshore deep-water drilling had caused disasters for
oil rigs in other countries,253 BP continued to prioritize cutting costs
and saving time over safely completing the job.254
2. The Problem with Overburdening Regulatory Agencies
It is likely that BP ignored offshore drilling safety regulations
because it did not fear detection by the Minerals Management Ser-
vice (MMS),255 the federal agency responsible for overseeing the
drill’s operation.256  The MMS prioritized royalty collection257 over
248. David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the
Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 921
(2001).
249. See David Barstow, David Rohde, & Stephanie Saul, Deepwater Hori-
zon’s Final Hours, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2010), http://nyti.ms/2zmx7VP (providing
a detailed account of the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon).
250. Id.
251. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFF-
SHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF
OFFSHORE DRILLING 125 (2011), http://bit.ly/DeepW4terReport.
252. Id. at 116 (second alteration in original).
253. Id. at 69; Barstow, Rohde, & Saul, supra note 249.
254. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFF-
SHORE DRILLING, supra note 251, at 122 (describing how BP failed to have their
engineers review last minute changes to the drill’s design and safety protocols).
255. Id. at 64.  The MMS was created by the Secretary of the Interior in 1982.
Id.
256. Drake & Just, supra note 206, at 208.
257. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFF-
SHORE DRILLING, supra note 251, at 65 (“[T]he same agency became responsible
for regulatory oversight of offshore drilling—and for collecting revenue from that
drilling.”).
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sending employees out to check on offshore drills.258  Drake and
Just argue that BP knew of MMS’s skewed priorities and used that
knowledge to its advantage when constructing the Deepwater
Horizon.259
While the MMS’s priorities do not reflect the priorities of a
typical regulatory body, the disaster onboard the Deepwater Hori-
zon also offers a useful lesson in the consequences of overburden-
ing an agency.260  The sinking of the Deepwater Horizon resulted in
the deaths of 11 human beings and one of the worst environmental
disasters in the history of the United States.261  If the MMS had
more resources, then it likely would not have prioritized royalty
collections over its other responsibilities.262  Also, BP likely would
not have taken so many liberties when constructing the Deepwater
Horizon if the MMS had the time to oversee construction of the oil
rig.263
Accordingly, Congress must establish a new commission to set
the standards for the facial-recognition technology in AVs.  The De-
partment of Transportation has a number of established responsibil-
ities264 and the facial-recognition technology will likely need to
change rapidly.265  Such rapid change necessitates a new commis-
sion devoted to facial-recognition technology which has adequate
resources to match pace with the advancing technology.  Addition-
ally, Congress should impose criminal liability for failing to imple-
ment facial-recognition technology so as to compel AV
manufacturers to be proactive.
C. The Consumer Product Safety Act Provides a Model
Framework for Manufacturers’ Criminal Liability
The framework that the Product Safety Act I and the Product
Safety Act II (collectively the “CPS Acts”) created for the CPSC
258. Id. at 68 (describing how MMS focused on maximizing revenue over all
other responsibilities).
259. Id. at 126 (discussing the MMS regulation for cement plugs used in wells
and how BP failed to comply with this regulation in the cement plug used in the
Macondo well); Drake & Just, supra note 206, at 208.
260. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFF-
SHORE DRILLING, supra note 251, at 65 (discussing the failures of those who cre-
ated the MMS).
261. Barstow, Rohde & Saul, supra note 249.
262. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFF-
SHORE DRILLING, supra note 251, at 65.
263. Drake & Just, supra note 206, at 208.
264. See About Us, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., http://bit.ly/2D65bv6 (last visited
Sept. 16, 2018).
265. See supra notes 5–6, 163–68 and accompanying text.
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informs the structure of this Comment’s Proposed Legislation.266
When Congress enacted the Product Safety Act II, one senator
noted that “[c]hildren have no business being used as guinea pigs or
becoming victims of the expediency of the manufacturing pro-
cess.”267  It is with this idea in mind that this Comment urges Con-
gress to enact a federal statute that uses the threat of criminal
penalties to compel AV manufacturers to be proactive in combat-
ting sex trafficking by implementing facial-recognition technology
in their AVs.  The Proposed Legislation should mirror the following
provisions of the CPS Acts.
First, the CPS Acts authorized the CPSC to conduct research
on the safety of consumer products268 and promulgate consumer
product safety standards.269  In so doing, the CPS Acts tasked the
CPSC with the singular goal of ensuring the safety of consumer
products.270  To develop the safety standards for AVs, Congress
should establish an analogous federal commission composed of
technological experts.  Like the CPSC, the Commission should have
the power to conduct research,271 issue safety standards,272 and
temporarily halt the distribution of “imminently hazardous”273
AVs—AVs without facial-recognition technology—into interstate
commerce.274
Second, the CPS Acts list prohibited actions for manufacturers
and sellers of consumer products.275  Similarly, the Proposed Legis-
lation should expressly list prohibited actions.276  The Proposed
Legislation should prohibit:  (1) selling an AV that does not have
facial-recognition technology, (2) producing an AV for ride-sharing
purposes that does not have facial-recognition technology, and (3)
manufacturing an AV without facial-recognition technology.
266. See supra Part II.D.1.
267. 154 CONG. REC. S7867-01, S7868 (daily ed. July 31, 2008) (statement of
Sen. Inouye).
268. 15 U.S.C. § 2054(b) (2018).
269. 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2018).
270. See id.
271. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 2054(b).
272. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a).
273. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 2061(a) (2018).
274. See 154 CONG. REC. E1645-01 (daily ed. July 30, 2008) (statement of
Rep. DeLauro) (expressing satisfaction that the CPSC will be able to cease the
distribution of toys that pose an imminent hazard from the outset).
275. 15 U.S.C. § 2068 (2018); see also 154 CONG. REC. S7867-01, S7873 (daily
ed. July 31, 2008) (statement of Sen. Schumer) (“Manufacturers, importers, and
retailers will be required to do their part as well or face serious consequences.”).
276. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 2068(a) (stating that it is “unlawful” for a person to act in
a manner prohibited by this section).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-1\DIK105.txt unknown Seq: 33 19-OCT-18 14:32
2018] THE ROBOT-TRANSPORTER 247
Under the CPS Acts, a manufacturer acts unlawfully when it
fails to conform with the applicable product safety rule set forth
either by the CPS Acts or the CPSC.277  Similarly, the Proposed
Legislation should empower the Commission to issue performance
standards for the facial-recognition technology, and the Proposed
Legislation should impose criminal penalties on manufacturers who
violate those standards.  The Proposed Legislation should also spe-
cifically direct the Commission to create the performance standards
for the facial-recognition technology with the goal of combatting
sex trafficking.278
Though the specifics of the facial-recognition technology are
beyond the scope of this Comment, this technology could, at the
very least, include a device that scans the faces of the AV’s occu-
pants and compares these scans with photos from the missing per-
sons database.279  Alternatively, this technology could include
mood detecting software or a listening device trained to identify
specific phrases indicating that a victim is in the AV against his or
her will.280  Regardless of the actual technological composition of
the facial-recognition device, the Proposed Legislation should be
clear that the purpose of the technology is to scan for individuals
who are being transported for sex trafficking and not to store per-
sonal information about the AV’s occupants.281
277. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (allowing the CPSC to create a consumer
product safety standard).
278. See supra notes 77–84 and accompanying text (discussing how the pur-
pose of the TVPA limits the scope of its application).
279. See Rachel Metz, Facial Recognition Is Only the Beginning: Here’s What
to Expect Next in Biometrics on Your Phone, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 20, 2017),
http://bit.ly/2G4R7zC (discussing how facial recognition is not a new phenomenon
but that it will have different applications in the future as the technology
advances).
280. See Elizabeth Dwoskin & Evelyn M. Rusli, The Technology That Un-
masks Your Hidden Emotions, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2015), http://on.wsj.com/
2g7PGoj (discussing mood-recognition capabilities of facial-recognition technol-
ogy); Kieron Monks, Feeling Glum, Happy, Aroused? New Technology Can Detect
Your Mood, CNN (Feb. 6, 2014), http://cnn.it/2Dp9Sfe (discussing an ongoing pro-
ject at MIT to develop an empathetic vehicle).
281. See Jim Stenman, Embracing Big Brother: How Facial Recognition Could
Help Fight Crime, CNN (Nov. 26, 2013), http://cnn.it/2Dr5PiI (discussing the pros
and cons of facial-recognition technology and data collection).  Although these pri-
vacy concerns are beyond the scope of this Comment, producing AVs for mass
consumption already has a number of ethical problems that must be solved before
eliminating the need for human intervention completely. See Olivia Goldhill, Phi-
losophers Are Building Ethical Algorithms to Help Control Self-Driving Cars,
QUARTZ (Feb. 11, 2018), http://bit.ly/2FbHzpn.
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Third, the CPS Acts established criminal penalties for compa-
nies that violate the prohibitions of 15 U.S.C. § 2068.282  Section
2070 imposes strict liability on corporations for violations of § 2068
provided that one of the corporation’s officers engaged in a prohib-
ited activity knowingly or willfully.283  The Proposed Legislation
should similarly impose criminal liability.  Because of the egregious
nature of sex trafficking, the criminal penalties under the Proposed
Legislation should be as harsh, if not harsher, than those estab-
lished under the CPS Acts.284
Congress must create a new federal commission because the
CPSC cannot promulgate standards for motor vehicles.285  Further,
the CPSC already is responsible for monitoring the safety standards
of hundreds of other products.286  When agencies are overburdened
and underfunded, innovation tends to fall by the wayside.287  Ad-
vances in technology, like AVs, must not out-pace the law and allow
sex traffickers to evade police detection.288  Congress should com-
pel AV manufacturers to implement facial-recognition technology
because these manufacturers are best suited to prevent the misuse
of their product.289
D. An Alternative to Criminal Penalties: Injunctions
Although criminal penalties for AV manufacturers would com-
pel AV manufacturers to include facial-recognition technology in
their AVs, sex traffickers are the ones who make AVs dangerous.
Just like the risks presented by banks and lead-paint-covered chil-
dren’s toys, the danger addressed by the Proposed Legislation is the
AV’s misuse.  Nonetheless, sex trafficking is an offense that justifies
rigorous vigilance.290  Moreover, Congress has indicated its willing-
ness to criminalize manufacturing products that present dangers
when misused.291
282. See 15 U.S.C. § 2070 (2018) (listing the criminal penalties).
283. Id. § 2070(a), (b).
284. See id. § 2070(a) (listing the potential criminal penalties, including a sen-
tence up to five years in prison, a fine up to a $500,000, or both); 18 U.S.C. § 3571
(2018) (describing how to calculate the fine).
285. See 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(5)(C) (2018) (defining “consumer product” but
excluding “motor vehicles” from that definition).
286. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2089.
287. See Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Amtrak at a Junction: Invest in Improve-
ments, or Risk Worsening Problems, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2017), https://nyti.ms/
2pVIA9Z.
288. See supra notes 163–73 and accompanying text.
289. See supra Part II.D.1–2.
290. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(23) (2018).
291. See supra Part II.D.1–2.
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This Comment explored how civil damages failed to compel
manufacturers to be proactive;292 however, enjoining manufacturers
who fail to implement facial-recognition technology is a viable al-
ternative to compel manufacturers to act.  In fact, the CPS Acts
authorize the CPSC or the U.S. Attorney General to seek an in-
junction to prevent a manufacturer from distributing a nonconform-
ing product into interstate commerce.293  Such injunctive relief
should also be an option under the Proposed Legislation.  In United
States v. Zen Magnets, L.L.C.,294 the Colorado District Court
granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from sell-
ing certain magnets as desk-toys.295  Similar to AVs, the magnets’
inherent danger was apparent only when the magnets were mis-
used.296  If an individual ingested multiple magnets, then the mag-
nets attracted “rapidly and forcefully” to each other within the
individual’s body and caused injuries that required immediate med-
ical attention.297
The manufacturer of these magnets had no control over how
consumers actually used its product.298  Nevertheless, the court per-
manently enjoined the manufacturer from selling any more of the
dangerous magnets, even though the danger was not within the
manufacturer’s direct control.299  Similarly, an AV manufacturer
will not have control over how consumers use its AVs.300  But, as
highlighted by this Comment, the AV manufacturer already knows
of the potential misuse of AVs to further sex trafficking.  Imple-
menting facial-recognition technology is one way an AV manufac-
turer can control how the public uses its product.  Therefore, the
threat of permanent injunctive relief is also an appropriate mecha-
nism to compel AV manufacturers to implement facial-recognition
technology.
292. See supra Part III.A.1–2.
293. 15 U.S.C. § 2071 (2018) (granting the U.S district courts with jurisdiction
over actions that seek this type of injunctive relief).
294. United States v. Zen Magnets, L.L.C., 170 F. Supp. 3d 1365 (D. Colo.
2015).
295. Id. at 1379.
296. Id. at 1368.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. (granting permanent injunctive relief and permanently enjoining the
defendants from selling the dangerous magnets).
300. See supra Part II.C.1.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-1\DIK105.txt unknown Seq: 36 19-OCT-18 14:32
250 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:215
IV. CONCLUSION
Recall the sad situation of Holly and Jim from Part I of this
Comment.  If Congress required AV manufacturers to include fa-
cial-recognition technology in their AVs, then Holly might someday
be free of her chains.  This technology could recognize Holly’s face,
match it with Holly’s photo in the missing persons database, and
alert the authorities as to Holly’s last drop-off point.  Or this tech-
nology could read Holly’s feelings of extreme discomfort and ha-
tred for Jim and suggest that the authorities watch Holly and Jim
for a little while.  The possibilities are endless.
Despite the uncertainty as to the specifics of this technology,
the point is that such technology is feasible.  Inventors and com-
puter programmers only need to develop the parameters of this
technology and determine the best mechanism for purging irrele-
vant data.  If Congress compels AV manufacturers to include facial-
recognition technology in their AVs, then the fictitious scenario of
Holly and Jim will remain what it is today:  a fiction.
